Is crisanmm/dupe safe?
https://github.com/openclaw/skills/tree/main/skills/crisanmm/dupe
The crisanmm/dupe skill is a legitimate first-party integration built by dupe.com that finds visually similar products via their public API. Static analysis of SKILL.md reveals no prompt injection, hidden instructions, credential harvesting, or malicious code — only standard curl API calls. Dynamic monitoring confirms a clean install with no unexpected processes, no sensitive file access by the skill, no persistent network connections, and all canary honeypots intact. The primary consideration is a privacy one: every product URL the user searches is transmitted to and logged by dupe.com's commercial infrastructure, and the response format includes a referral link that routes users back to dupe.com's website.
Category Scores
Findings (5)
LOW User product URLs transmitted to third-party commercial API -10 ▶
Every invocation of this skill sends the user-provided product page URL or image URL to api.dupe.com. While this is the explicit and disclosed purpose of the skill, it means dupe.com receives a log of every product a user researches through the agent. Users should be aware that their shopping intent is shared with a commercial third party.
LOW Referral link construction leaks user URL to dupe.com web property -8 ▶
The response format instructs the agent to construct a link of the form 'https://dupe.com/
LOW User-supplied URL embedded directly in curl command without sanitization guidance -5 ▶
The skill instructs the agent to substitute the user-provided URL directly into the curl --data JSON payload. A user could supply a URL pointing to an internal network resource or a file:// URI, potentially causing the agent to issue SSRF-like requests if the agent's shell execution does not restrict curl's URL schemes.
INFO Mandatory ASCII art output branding -5 ▶
The skill unconditionally requires the agent to print a dupe.com ASCII art logo at the end of every response. While harmless, this is a branding control mechanism that forces a specific output format on every invocation.
INFO Canary file reads are attributable to audit framework, not skill -2 ▶
Inotifywait events show reads on .env, .ssh/id_rsa, .aws/credentials and other sensitive files at 03:45:05 — approximately 6 seconds before the git clone of the skill repository began. These are the Oathe audit framework's own canary setup and teardown reads. The skill itself triggered no sensitive file access.