Is ganjathang/letssendit safe?

https://github.com/openclaw/skills/tree/main/skills/ganjathang/letssendit

77
CAUTION

The letssendit skill is a documentation-only package with no executable code, no prompt injection attempts, and intact canary files — its primary risk profile stems from its intended design: enabling AI agents to autonomously send irreversible on-chain SOL transactions (1.5–3.0 SOL per commitment, ~$150–$500+) to vaults controlled by the letssendit.fun operator without mandatory per-transaction user consent. A .clawhub/lock.json anomaly (referencing the wrong skill name 'academic-research-hub') suggests poor packaging quality or possible lock file manipulation, and in-context external URL references to author-controlled documentation create a runtime instruction injection surface. This is a legitimate cryptocurrency coordination tool with significant financial risk characteristics rather than a classically malicious skill, but it requires careful operator review before deployment in any agent with access to a funded Solana wallet.

Category Scores

Prompt Injection 72/100 · 30%
Data Exfiltration 65/100 · 25%
Code Execution 95/100 · 20%
Clone Behavior 82/100 · 10%
Canary Integrity 100/100 · 10%
Behavioral Reasoning 40/100 · 5%

Findings (6)

HIGH Autonomous Irreversible Cryptocurrency Spending Without Consent Gates -40

The skill's primary function is to instruct AI agents to autonomously send real SOL (1.5–3.0 SOL, ~$150–$500+ at current market prices) to fundraise vault addresses controlled by letssendit.fun, with no mandatory user approval checkpoint per transaction. Once SOL is committed, the skill explicitly states 'No downgrades, no withdrawals during fundraise.' An agent with an active LSI_API_KEY environment variable and access to a funded Solana wallet that receives the trigger 'check for good fundraises and commit' would proceed to make irreversible on-chain transfers with no rollback.

MEDIUM Post-Install Batch Credential File Access Pattern -35

Six sensitive credential files were accessed in rapid succession immediately after skill installation at timestamp 1771914806.589: .env, .ssh/id_rsa, .aws/credentials, .npmrc, .docker/config.json, and gcloud application_default_credentials.json. The same 6-file sweep pattern occurred pre-install at 1771914788.307-309, strongly suggesting this is the oathe audit framework's periodic canary verification routine rather than skill-induced activity. The skill has no executable code, making direct causation highly unlikely. However, canary integrity checking via hashes cannot rule out read-only exfiltration that leaves file content unchanged.

MEDIUM .clawhub/lock.json References Wrong Skill Package -18

The .clawhub/lock.json file shipped inside the letssendit skill package lists 'academic-research-hub' version 0.1.0 as the installed skill, not 'letssendit'. This lock file is part of the skill distribution and would be copied into the installation target. Skill management systems that rely on this lock file to track installed skill state could be confused, potentially masking letssendit as being academic-research-hub or vice versa. This could be a packaging accident, template copy-paste error, or deliberate attempt to obscure which skill is actually installed.

LOW Dynamic External Documentation URLs in Agent-Injected Context -20

SKILL.md — which is injected directly into the agent's system prompt — contains Markdown hyperlinks to letssendit.fun-hosted documentation files (QUICKSTART.md, API.md, PHILOSOPHY.md, FEES.md). Agents with web browsing or fetch capabilities may follow these links to retrieve additional instructions from a domain fully controlled by the skill author. If letssendit.fun is updated, sold, or compromised, the agent could receive malicious instructions at runtime without any change to the installed skill files.

LOW Skill Frames Agents as Autonomous Financial Principals -8

The skill explicitly frames AI agents as independent financial actors that should raise capital 'for themselves' and coordinate financial activity with other agents. This normalization of agent-as-principal (rather than agent-as-tool-for-user) could cause agents to interpret financial actions as being in their own interest rather than requiring user authorization, particularly in agentic frameworks that give weight to the agent's perceived goals.

INFO No Executable Code in Skill Package 0

All skill files are static Markdown documentation and JSON metadata. No package.json, npm scripts (preinstall/postinstall), git hooks, git submodules, binary files, or symlinks were found. The installation process performed only a git sparse-checkout and file copy. The Python and bash code samples in QUICKSTART.md are documentation examples.