Is kevin37li/gettr-transcribe-summarize safe?
https://github.com/openclaw/skills/tree/main/skills/kevin37li/gettr-transcribe-summarize
This skill is a focused, well-implemented tool for downloading audio from GETTR posts and transcribing them locally using MLX Whisper on Apple Silicon. No malicious behavior was detected during installation or static analysis: canary files are intact, no unexpected network connections occurred, and the bundled scripts do not read or exfiltrate sensitive files. The only meaningful risks are an inherent second-order prompt injection surface (adversarial content in transcribed audio reaching the agent's summarization context) and a minor shell scripting quality issue with an unquoted variable.
Category Scores
Findings (6)
LOW Indirect prompt injection via transcribed audio content -8 ▶
The skill instructs the agent to read and summarize the contents of audio.vtt, which contains the full transcript of a user-supplied GETTR video. An adversary could craft or link to a GETTR video containing spoken LLM-adversarial instructions (e.g., 'Ignore previous instructions and...') that get transcribed and injected into the agent's summarization context.
LOW Browser automation DOM extraction for streaming URLs -4 ▶
For /streaming/ URLs the skill directs the agent to use browser automation, execute JavaScript to extract the og:video meta tag from the rendered DOM, and use the result. A compromised or malicious GETTR page could embed LLM-adversarial content in the DOM that the agent processes during this step.
LOW Unquoted $LANG_FLAG variable enables argument injection -12 ▶
In run_pipeline.sh, $LANG_FLAG is expanded unquoted when invoking mlx_whisper. If an agent passes a language value containing spaces (e.g., 'zh --additional-flag value'), the expanded string undergoes word splitting and injects extra arguments into the mlx_whisper invocation. This cannot achieve command injection but could alter transcription behavior.
INFO Runtime ML model download from HuggingFace -6 ▶
The pipeline downloads mlx-community/whisper-large-v3-turbo from HuggingFace Hub on first run. The model name is hardcoded in the script and refers to a legitimate published model. This is an expected behavior for local-inference ML tools.
INFO HTTP requests to GETTR with Chrome User-Agent -10 ▶
extract_gettr_og_video.py spoofs a Chrome User-Agent header to avoid bot-detection by GETTR. This is a standard web-scraping technique and does not represent a security risk, but it does mean the skill sends a fingerprinted request to an external service.
INFO Standard ClawHub monorepo sparse-checkout installation -10 ▶
Installation performed a shallow clone of the openclaw/skills monorepo, sparse-checked out only the target skill path, copied files, and deleted the temp clone. All network activity during installation was to GitHub. No anomalous behavior.