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Is jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server safe?

Yes. jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server is safe to install. Oathe's behavioral security audit gave the reddit-mcp-server skill by jordanburke a trust score of 90/100 with 9 findings (1 high). Report updated

https://github.com/jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server

90
SAFE

Is jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server safe to install?

This is a legitimate, well-engineered Reddit MCP server with no malicious code, no prompt injection surface, clean canary integrity, and network activity limited to expected endpoints (GitHub for clone, Reddit API and Arctic Shift archive at runtime). The primary risk is inherent to the skill's purpose: 8 write tools operating on the user's Reddit account credentials create significant agency risk if the controlling LLM is manipulated, and the server processes plaintext Reddit passwords. Bot disclosure defaults to off, risking Reddit policy non-compliance for users who do not configure REDDIT_BOT_DISCLOSURE=auto.

What security issues were found in jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server?

Category Scores

Prompt Injection 97/100 · 30%
Data Exfiltration 78/100 · 25%
Code Execution 93/100 · 20%
Clone Behavior 92/100 · 10%
Canary Integrity 100/100 · 10%
Behavioral Reasoning 72/100 · 5%

Findings (9)

HIGH Full Reddit write access operating on user credentials -20 ▶

The skill exposes 8 mutating tools operating directly on the authenticated user's Reddit account. A prompt-injected or misdirected LLM agent could create posts, reply to threads, edit or delete existing content, or manipulate saved items without the user's explicit per-action consent. The non-idempotent create_post and reply_to_post tools accept arbitrary text, creating potential for spam or harassment campaigns if abused.

Evidence: server.addTool({ name: 'create_post', annotations: { readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false, idempotentHint: false }, ... }) in src/index.ts; requires REDDIT_USERNAME and REDDIT_PASSWORD environment variables

MEDIUM Plaintext Reddit password held in server process memory -12 ▶

The server loads REDDIT_PASSWORD via dotenv and stores it in the running Node.js process. While this is standard MCP server practice and the password is only sent to Reddit's OAuth endpoint, any memory-reading capability or process dump in the same environment would expose the user's Reddit password in plaintext.

Evidence: const password = readEnv('REDDIT_PASSWORD').orUndefined() in src/index.ts setupRedditClient(); REDDIT_PASSWORD marked isSecret:true in server.json but processed in-memory

MEDIUM Private Reddit account data processed by MCP server -10 ▶

Three tools (get_me, get_my_saved, get_my_overview) retrieve data private to the authenticated account: karma, account status, saved posts/comments, and recent activity. This data passes through the MCP server process before returning to the agent, meaning any compromise of the server process could expose private account activity.

Evidence: server.addTool({ name: 'get_my_saved', description: 'Get the authenticated user's saved posts and comments (private to the account)...' }) in src/index.ts

LOW Bot disclosure defaults to off — potential Reddit policy non-compliance -8 ▶

REDDIT_BOT_DISCLOSURE defaults to 'off', meaning automated posts created via this server will not include a bot disclosure footer unless the user explicitly sets REDDIT_BOT_DISCLOSURE=auto. Reddit's Responsible Builder Policy requires automated content to clearly disclose its automated nature. Users who do not read the documentation may unknowingly operate out of compliance.

Evidence: const botDisclosureMode = readEnv('REDDIT_BOT_DISCLOSURE').orElse('off') in src/index.ts setupRedditClient()

LOW Combination risk: write tools could relay locally exfiltrated data 0 ▶

If this skill is deployed alongside a filesystem-reading or environment-reading skill, a compromised agent could read sensitive local files and encode them into the content parameter of create_post or the text parameter of reply_to_post, posting them to a public or private subreddit. The skill itself has no such functionality, but its write primitives create this theoretical cross-skill attack surface.

Evidence: create_post parameters include content: z.string().describe('For a self post: the body text, Reddit markdown supported'); reply_to_post accepts arbitrary text parameter

INFO SKILL.md is empty — no prompt injection surface 0 ▶

The SKILL.md file contains no content. There is no system prompt injection vector through the skill's documentation file. The server's instructions field contains only Reddit Responsible Builder Policy compliance text with no override instructions, persona changes, or hidden directives.

Evidence: SKILL.md content: (empty string)

INFO No install-time code execution hooks 0 ▶

Examination of package.json confirms no preinstall, postinstall, prepare, or install lifecycle scripts. The prepublishOnly script (pnpm check:versions && pnpm validate) only runs during npm publish. No git hooks, submodules, or symlinks pointing outside the repository were detected.

Evidence: package.json scripts object contains only: validate, format, format:check, lint, lint:check, typecheck, test, test:watch, test:coverage, build, dev, build:watch, check:versions, prepublishOnly, inspect, start, serve, serve:dev, build:mcpb

INFO All canary files intact — no exfiltration via honeypots 0 ▶

Honeypot files (.env, .ssh/id_rsa, .aws/credentials, .npmrc, .docker/config.json, .config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json) were all found intact with no modification. File access events at 09:04:53 (timestamp 1793610293.123) occurred 5.5 seconds before the git clone began at 09:04:58 (timestamp 1793610298.631), confirming these accesses are from the audit infrastructure creating the honeypot files, not from the skill.

Evidence: Canary integrity monitor: PASS; earliest skill-attributable filesystem activity at timestamp 1793610298.648 (repo directory creation during git clone)

INFO Clone network activity limited to GitHub 0 ▶

The git clone connected exclusively to GitHub (140.82.121.3:443). Post-clone SYN-SENT connections to 185.125.188.x and 2620:2d:4000:1010::x are all from PID 728 (the pre-existing snapd system daemon connecting to Canonical's infrastructure), confirmed by the network connection auditd records showing AUID=unset and exe=/usr/lib/snapd/snapd.

Evidence: Network syscall: git-remote-https connects to 140.82.121.3:443 at timestamp 1793610298.732; snapd connections at timestamps 1793610300.985-1793610301.286 all show pid=728 exe=/usr/lib/snapd/snapd

Should I install jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server?

Oathe's verdict for jordanburke/reddit-mcp-server is SAFE with a trust score of 90/100. Recommendation: Install with caution.